The making of target publics and its layers of inertia
On the same publics, the government-to-opposition switch flips the affective regime by 23 to 32 pp, but does not displace publics to other domains (r = 0.96 between profiles) and barely touches the proof burden (≈ 2 pp). Plasticity is real, but bounded to affect.
The probative gradient runs between groups (3 % for the middle class, 17 % for low-income people) and between parties, not between government and opposition (only +2 pp). Proof surges within deliberative peaks, where informational theory expects it, not where the negativity bias predicted.
Net of party × position × year cell averages, MPs hold individual regimes of their own (σ = 7.2 pp on negativity, vs 2.6 under permutation, p < 0.002; σ = 3.6 pp on proof). Their thematic portfolios self-correlate at 0.945 across career halves, against 0.869 with party colleagues.
Beyond budgets and administrative outputs, the discursive fabric of target publics becomes measurable: 17 publics × 21 CAP domains × two regimes (affective + probative), at the sentence level, on millions of utterances. A replicable pipeline, comparable across time, parliaments, and languages.